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The Effectiveness of University Technology Transfer: 
Lessons Learned from Quantitative and Qualitative  
Research in the U.S. and the U.K. 
 
Abstract 
  In  recent  years,  there  have  been  numerous  studies  of  the  effectiveness  of  university 
technology  transfer.    Such  technology  transfer  mechanisms  include  licensing  agreements 
between  the  university  and  private  firms,  science  parks,  incubators,  and  university-based 
startups.  We review and synthesize these papers and present some pointed recommendations on 
how to enhance effectiveness.  Implementation of these recommendations will depend on the 
mechanisms that universities choose to stress, based on their technology transfer “strategy.”   For 
example, institutions that emphasize the entrepreneurial dimension of technology transfer must 
address skill deficiencies in technology transfer offices, reward systems that are inconsistent with 
enhanced entrepreneurial activity and the lack of training for faculty members, post-docs, and 
graduate students in starting new ventures or interacting with entrepreneurs.  We conjecture that 
business schools are best positioned to address these skill and educational deficiencies through 
the delivery of targeted programs to technology licensing officers and members of the campus 
community wishing to launch startup firms.   
 
JEL classification: M13 ; D24; L31; O31; O32  
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I. Introduction 
At the same time that technology transfer has been considered by policymakers  as  a 
driver of national and regional economic growth in the U.S. and U.K., an increasing number of 
university officials at leading research universities have also viewed technology transfer as a 
potential  source  of  substantial  revenue  for  their  institutions.    The  key  university  technology 
transfer  commercialization  mechanisms  are  licensing  agreements  between  the  university  and 
private  firms,  research  joint  ventures,  and  university-based  startups.    These  activities  can 
potentially result in financial gains for the university, other benefits to these institutions (e.g., 
additional sponsored research, hiring of graduate students and post-doctoral fellows), and job 
creation in the local region.  Given the importance of these commercialization mechanisms, 
many universities and policymakers continually seek guidance on how to evaluate and enhance 
effectiveness in university technology transfer.   
Organizations as the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) in the 
U.S. and the University Companies Association (UNICO) and the Association for University 
Research Industry Links (AURIL) in the U.K. have helped to promote technology transfer 
activity by publishing benchmarking surveys.  These surveys have been used by scholars to 
explore key research questions relating to the drivers of effective university technology transfer.  
While these studies have been useful, the literature remains somewhat embryonic with many 
unresolved managerial and policy issues.   
  In many countries, national governments have provided support for these initiatives via 
legislation to facilitate technological diffusion from universities to firms (e.g., the Bayh-Dole Act 
of  1980)  and  collaborative  research  (e.g.,  the  National  Cooperative  Research  Act  of  1984), 
subsidies for research joint ventures involving universities and firms (e.g., the European Union’s   4 
Framework Programmes and the U.S. Commerce Department’s Advanced Technology Program 
(ATP),  and  shared  use  of  expertise  and  laboratory  facilities  (e.g.,  the  National  Science 
Foundation’s  Engineering  Research  Centers,  Science  and  Technology  Centers,  and  Industry-
University  Cooperative  Research  Centers).    Along  these  lines,  national,  state,  and  regional 
government authorities have also provided support for science parks and incubators. 
The growth in private and public investment in university-based technology initiatives 
has raised important policy questions regarding  the impact of such activities on researchers, 
universities, firms, and local regions where such investments occur.  Given that many of these 
initiatives  are  relatively  new,  university  officials  and  policymakers  seek  guidance  on  “best 
practices.”   More specifically, they seek evidence on specific organizational practices related to 
incentives,  strategic  objectives,  and  measurement  and  monitoring  mechanisms,  which  might 
enhance technology transfer effectiveness.  Inductive, qualitative research is also useful in this 
context, since notions of “effectiveness” are likely to vary across different types of initiatives 
(e.g.,  incubators  vs.  technology  transfer  offices)  and  for  different  players  involved  in  such 
activities (e.g., university scientists, university administrators, and corporations interacting with 
the university).   
 The purpose of this paper is to review and synthesize research on the antecedents and 
consequences of university-based technology transfer and to explore the implications for practice 
and future research in this domain.   Before presenting a review of the extant literature, it is 
useful to provide some background information on the rise of university technology transfer.   
  In the late 1970’s, U.S. research universities were often criticized for being more adept at 
developing new technologies than facilitating their commercialization into the private sector 
(General Accounting Office, 1998).  Further, it was asserted that the long lag between the   5 
discovery and commercialization of new knowledge at the university had weakened the global 
competitiveness of American firms (Marshall, 1985).  While such conclusions glossed over the 
principal mission of research universities as knowledge creators, it created enough concern for 
policymakers to take action. As a consequence, in 1980, the U.S. Congress attempted to remove 
potential obstacles to university technology transfer by passing the Bayh-Dole Act.  Bayh-Dole 
instituted a uniform patent policy across federal agencies, removed many restrictions on 
licensing, and allowed universities to own patents arising from federal research grants.  The 
framers of this legislation asserted that university ownership and management of intellectual 
property would accelerate the commercialization of new technologies and promote economic 
development and entrepreneurial activity.   
  In the aftermath of this legislation, almost all research universities in the U.S. established 
technology transfer offices (TTOs) to manage and protect their intellectual property.  The 
number increased eightfold, to more than 200, resulting in a fourfold increase in the volume of 
university patents registered (Mowery & Shane, 2002).  TTOs facilitate commercial knowledge 
transfers through the licensing to industry of patents or other forms of intellectual property 
resulting from university research.  The Association of University Technology Managers reports 
that from 1991 to 1997, university revenues from licensing IP have increased over 315%, from 
$220 million to $698 million (AUTM, 2000).  The number of firms that utilize university-based 
technologies has also increased, and evidence suggests that venture capitalists are increasingly 
interested in ventures founded on the basis of basic research (Small Business Association, 2002).  
Our literature review will also encompass the institutional context of university 
technology transfer, which includes science parks, and incubators.  We will also discuss the 
organizational context, including organizational design, processes, and incentives, as well as the   6 
roles of individual agents, such as scientists and technology transfer officers.  Finally, because 
much of the early research has focused measures of effectiveness and the building of robust 
theoretical models depended on well specified dependent variables, we review research on 
measures of technology transfer effectiveness such as licensing revenues, the introduction of new 
products and services, and new business starts.     
The remainder of this article is organized as follows:  In the following sections, we 
present an extensive review of the literature on university technology licensing, selected studies 
of science parks, and studies of start-up formation at universities.  Section II discusses the 
institutional context of university technology transfer.  The following section considers the 
organizational context of this activity.  Section IV contains a discussion of the role of individual 
agents (i.e., academic and industry scientists, entrepreneurs, managers at firms and universities) 
in university technology transfer.  Section V presents some methodological issues, in the context 
of a review of studies of licensing and business formation.  Section VI presents lessons learned 
for policymakers and university administrators. The final section consists of conclusions.   
 
II. The Institutional Contexts of University Technology Transfer 
In Tables 1, 2, and 3, we summarize some recent quantitative and qualitative studies on 
university technology transfer via licensing, science parks, and new business formation, 
respectively.  As demonstrated on these tables, recent studies concerning university technology 
transfer include, but are not limited to, faculty participation in technology commercialization 
(Bercovitz & Feldman, 2005; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2003), university licensing strategies 
(Feldman, Feller, Bercovitz, & Burton, 2002); university incentives and licensing revenues (Lach 
& Schankerman, 2005; Siegel, Waldman, & Link, 2003); U.S. and Sweden policies on invention   7 
commercialization (Goldfarb & Henrekson, 2003); firm linkages to universities (Cohen, Nelson, 
& Walsh, 2002; Rothaermel & Thursby, 2005; Thursby and Thursby, 2003); issues of moral-
hazard problems in technology licensing (Jensen & Thursby, 2001); the performance of licensing 
firms (George, Zahra, & Wood, 2002), antecedents to commercialization speed of university-
based inventions (Markman, Gianiodis, Phan & Balkin, 2005a), and the performance of 
university-based start-up companies (Link & Scott, 2005; Lockett & Wright, 2005; Shane & 
Stuart, 2002).  In sum, the scope and depth of the research is now at the level that we can draw 
normative conclusions from a review.  
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It became apparent in early research that the success of a university’s licensing program 
depended on its institutional structure, organizational capability, and incentive systems to   8 
encourage participation by researchers.  Pursuing this line of inquiry, Siegel, Waldman, and Link 
(2003) presented quantitative and qualitative evidence on the efficiency of university technology 
transfer, derived from the AUTM survey and 55 structured, in-person interviews of 100 
university technology transfer stakeholders (i.e. academic and industry scientists, university 
technology managers, and corporate managers and entrepreneurs) at five research universities in 
Arizona and North Carolina.  The authors concluded that intellectual property policies and 
organizational practices can potentially enhance (or impede) technology transfer effectiveness.  
Specifically, they found that informational and cultural barriers existed between universities and 
firms, especially for small firms, and that if these were not explicitly considered in the transfer 
process, the perceived attractiveness of university technology to commercial innovators is 
attenuated.   
This result was consistent with Clarke (1998), who found evidence on the importance of 
institutional norms, standards, and culture.  Based on a qualitative analysis of five European 
universities that had outstanding performance in technology transfer, he concluded that the 
existence of an entrepreneurial culture at those institutions was a critical factor in their success 
(Clarke, 1998).  Additionally, Roberts (1991) found that social norms and MIT’s tacit approval 
of entrepreneurs were critical determinants of successful academic entrepreneurship at MIT.  
Interestingly, the availability of venture capital in the region where the university is 
located and the commercial orientation of the university (proxied by the percentage of the 
university’s research budget that is derived from industry) are found to have an insignificant 
impact on the rate of startup formation (DiGregorio and Shane, 2003).   9 
Degroof and Roberts (2004) examine the importance of university policies related to 
startups in regions where environmental factors (e.g., technology transfer and infrastructure for 
entrepreneurship) are not particularly conducive to entrepreneurial activity.  The authors offered 
taxonomy for four types of startup policies: an absence of startup policies, minimal 
selectivity/support, intermediate selectivity/support, and comprehensive selectivity/support.  
Consistent with Roberts and Malone (1996), they found that comprehensive selectivity/support   
is the optimal policy for generating startups that can exploit venture with high growth potential.  
However, while such a policy is ideal, it may not be feasible given the resource constraints faced 
by universities.  The authors conclude that while spinout policies matter in the sense that they 
affect the growth potential of ventures, it may be more desirable to formulate such policies at a 
higher level of aggregation than the university.   
Franklin, Wright, and Lockett (2001) analyze perceptions at U.K. universities regarding 
entrepreneurial startups that emerge from university technology transfer.  The authors distinguish 
between academic and surrogate (external) entrepreneurs and “old” and “new” universities in the 
U.K.  Old universities have well-established research reputations, world-class scientists, and are 
typically receptive to entrepreneurial startups.  New universities, on the other hand, tend to be 
somewhat weaker in academic research and less flexible with regard to entrepreneurial ventures. 
They find that the most significant barriers to the adoption of entrepreneurial-friendly policies 
are cultural and informational and that the universities generating the most startups (i.e., old 
universities) are those that have the most favorable policies regarding surrogate (external) 
entrepreneurs.   
 
   10 
III. The Organizational Context of University Technology Transfer 
Bercovitz, Feldman, Feller, and Burton (2001) examine the organizational structure of 
the TTO and its relationship to the overall university research administration.  Based on the 
theoretical work of Alfred Chandler and Oliver Williamson, they analyze the performance 
implications of four organizational forms: the functional or unitary form (U-Form), the 
multidivisional (M-form), the holding company (H-form), and the matrix form (MX-form).  The 
authors note that these structures have different implications for the ability of a university to 
coordinate activity, facilitate internal and external information flows, and align incentives in a 
manner that is consistent with its strategic goals with respect to technology transfer.  
  To test these assertions, they examine TTOs at Duke, Johns Hopkins, and Penn State and 
find evidence of alternative organizational forms at these three institutions.  They attempt to link 
these  differences  in  structure  to  variation  in  technology  transfer  performance  along  three 
dimensions:  transaction  output,  the  ability  to  coordinate  licensing  and  sponsored  research 
activities,  and  incentive  alignment  capability.    While  further  research  is  needed  to  make 
conclusive statements regarding organizational structure and performance, their findings imply 
that organizational form does matter.   
Related to this issue of organizational structure, a surprising conclusion of Markman, 
Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2005) is that the most “attractive” combinations of technology 
stage and licensing strategy for new venture creation, i.e. early stage technology, combined with 
licensing for equity, are least likely to be favored by the university and thus not likely to be used.  
That is because universities and TTOs are typically focused on short-term cash maximization, 
and extremely risk-averse with respect to financial and legal risks.  Their findings are consistent 
with evidence presented in Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link (2004), who found that TTOs   11 
appear to do a better job of serving the needs of large firms than small, entrepreneurial 
companies.  The results of these studies imply that universities should modify their technology 
transfer strategies if they are serious about promoting entrepreneurial development. In Markman, 
Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2005b), the authors find that speed of process matters, in the sense 
that the “faster” TTOs can commercialize technologies that are protected by patents, the greater 
the returns to the university and the higher the rate of startup formation.  They also report that 
there are three key determinants of speed: TTO resources, competency in identifying licensees, 
and participation of faculty-inventors in the licensing process.  
  Along the same lines of inquiry, Lockett and Wright (2005) assessed the relationship 
between the resources and capabilities of U.K. TTOs and the rate of startup formation at their 
respective universities.  Here, the authors apply the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm to the 
university.  RBV asserts that an organization’s superior performance (in the parlance of strategic 
management, its “competitive advantage”) is related to its internal resources and capabilities.   
They are able to distinguish empirically between a university’s resource inputs and its routines 
and capabilities.   
  Based on estimation of count regressions (Poisson and Negative Binomial), the authors 
conclude that there is a positively correlation between startup formation and the university’s 
expenditure on intellectual property protection, the business development capabilities of TTOs, 
and the extent to which its royalty distribution formula favors faculty members.  These findings 
imply that universities wishing to spawn numerous startups should devote greater attention to 
recruitment, training, and development of technology transfer officers with broad-based 
commercial skills.     12 
  Markman, Gianiodis and Phan (2006), using a statistically random sample of 54 U.S. 
universities and 23,394 faculty/scientists, showed that bypassing (or gray market) activity is 
reduced when universities professionalize their technology licensing offices and when 
monitoring is delegated to dual agents who can better monitor agents, namely scientists/faculty 
departments.  Interestingly, the study also shows that increased bypassing activity is associated 
with more valuable discoveries and heightened entrepreneurial activities, highlighting the 
conundrum found in other studies; that universities focused on entrepreneurial startups may do 
well to reduce restrictions over intellectual property flows!   
  Siegel, Waldman, and Link (2003) found that the high rate of turnover among licensing 
officers was detrimental towards the establishment of long-term relationships with firms and 
entrepreneurs.  Other concerns they found were insufficient business and marketing experience 
in the TTO and the possible need for incentive compensation, as indicated by other studies.  In a 
subsequent paper, Link and Siegel (2005) find that the “royalty distribution formula,” which 
determines the fraction of revenue from a licensing transaction that is allocated to a faculty 
member who develops the new technology can potentially enhance technology licensing (as 
distinct from startup formation).  
  Using data on 113 U.S. TTOs, the authors found that universities allocating a higher 
percentage of royalty payments to faculty members tend to be more efficient in technology 
transfer activities (closer to the production frontier).  Organizational incentives for university 
technology transfer therefore appear to be an important determinant of success.  This finding was 
independently confirmed in Friedman and Silberman (2003) and Lach and Schankerman (2004), 
using slightly different methods and data. Finally, Markman, Gianiodis and Phan (2006) found   13 
that increasing royalty revenues to scientists’ departments is associated with increased gray 
market activity and patent citations.  
According to Thursby & Thursby (2004), TTOs can be modeled dual agents to obtain 
discoveries from faculty and to manage the commercialization process to industry incumbents 
for the university.  TTOs assess the potential rents derived from discoveries; seek IP protection 
for promising discoveries; solicit research sponsors and potential technology licensees; and 
manage and enforce contractual agreements with partners and licensees (cf., Markman, et al. 
2005c).  Hence, the structure of the TTO, as Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2004) 
found, was critical to the success of the transfer process.   
  Using an agency theoretic approach, Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2003) modeled the 
process of faculty disclosure and university licensing through a TTO as a game, in which the 
principal is the university administration and the faculty and TTO is a dual agent who maximized 
expected utilities.  The game is played when faculty members decide whether to disclose the 
invention to the TTO and at what stage, i.e. whether to disclose at the most embryonic stage or 
wait until it is a lab-scale prototype.  If an invention is disclosed, the TTO decides whether to 
search for a firm to license the technology and then negotiates the terms of the licensing 
agreement with the licensee.  The university administration influences the incentives of the TTO 
and faculty members by establishing policies for the distribution of licensing income and/or 
sponsored research.  According to the authors, the TTO engaged in a “balancing act,” in the 
sense that it can influence the rate of invention disclosures, must evaluate the inventions once 
they are disclosed, and negotiate licensing agreements with firms as the agent of the 
administration.    14 
The Jensen, Thursby, and Thursby (2003) theoretical analysis generates some interesting 
empirical predictions.  For instance, in equilibrium, the probability that a university scientist 
discloses an invention and the stage at which he or she discloses the invention is related to the 
pecuniary reward from licensing, as well as faculty quality.  The authors test the empirical 
implications of the dual agency model based on an extensive survey of the objectives, 
characteristics, and outcomes of licensing activity at 62 U.S. universities.
1   Their survey results 
provide empirical support for the hypothesis that the TTO is a dual agent.  They also find that 
faculty quality is positively associated with the rate of invention disclosure at the earliest stage 
and negatively associated with the share of licensing income allocated to inventors.   
Related to the above issue, Siegel, Waldman, and Link (2003) identified a mismatch 
between incentive systems for faculty involvement and the commercialization goals for 
university technology transfer.  This includes both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards, such as 
credit towards tenure and promotion.  Some respondents in the study even suggested that 
involvement in technology transfer could be detrimental to their careers.  Other authors have 
explored the role of incentives in university technology transfer.  For example, Markman, Phan, 
Balkin, and Giannodis (2004, 2005a) assessed the role of incentive systems in stimulating 
academic entrepreneurship and the determinants of innovation speed, or time to market.  An 
interesting result of Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2004) is that there is a positive 
association between compensation to TTO personnel and both equity licensing and startup 
formation.  Paradoxically, DiGregorio and Shane (2003) found that a royalty distribution formula 
that is more favorable to faculty members reduced startup formation, a finding that is confirmed 
by Markman, Phan, Balkin & Giannodis (2005a).  DiGregorio and Shane (2003) attributed this 
                                                 
1  See Thursby, Jensen, and Thursby (2001) for an extensive description of this survey.   15 
result to the higher opportunity cost associated with launching a new firm, relative to licensing 
the technology to an existing firm.   
O’Shea, Allen, and Arnaud (2005) extend these findings in several ways.  First, they 
employ a more sophisticated econometric technique employed by Blundell, Griffith, and Van 
Reenen (1995) on innovation counts, which accounts for unobserved heterogeneity across 
universities due to “history and tradition.”  This type of “path dependence” would seem to be 
quite important in the university context since university policies tend to evolve slowly.  Indeed, 
the authors find that a university’s previous success in technology transfer is a key explanatory 
factor of startup formation.  Consistent with DiGregorio and Shane (2003), they also find that 
faculty quality, commercial capability, and the extent of federal science and engineering funding 
are also significant determinants of higher rates of university startup formation.   
Moray and Clarysse (2005) adopt an institutional perspective on spinning off ventures as 
a venue for commercializing research. The central question they consider is the following: Are 
the resource endowments of science-based entrepreneurial firms at time of founding influenced 
by the way in which technology transfer is organized by the parent?  Interestingly, they adopt a 
multi-level longitudinal data approach and a mix of quantitative qualitative techniques based on 
the  Inter  University  Micro  Electronics  Centre  (henceforth,  IMEC)  in  Belgium,  a  research 
institute known for its international research excellence and with a track record in spinning off 
ventures.  Using  archival  data  sources,  standardized  questionnaires  and  semi-structured 
interviews, they collect regional data on spin out activity, data about technology transfer policies 
from all (senior) managers involved and data about the 23 science-based entrepreneurial ventures 
that  emerged  from  the  institute  until  200.  The  authors  assert  that  changes  in  the  internal   16 
institutional  set  up  --  and  the  technology  transfer  policy  in  particular  –  go  together  with  a 
changing overall tendency in the resources endowed to the science-based entrepreneurial firms. 
 They  identified  three  generations  of  companies  displaying  the  main  organizational 
changes in technology transfer policies and showed distinct resource characteristics at time of 
founding. The first generation of companies established during 1986-1995, received insufficient 
funding and the lack of experience of IMEC meant led to difficulties in evaluating capital needs.  
Most of the companies had a working alpha prototype when they started their business activities 
but  these  did  not  involve  the  formal  transfer  of  technology  from  the  university.  During  the 
second generation from 1996 to 1998, IMEC increasingly began to bring in IP into the firms 
through  licensing  agreements  but  failed  to  do  so  in  a  systematic  way.  Some  of  the  firms 
established in this period involved the spinning–off of technology and the receipt of start capital 
from IMEC and the attraction of further capital after 12-18 months from seed capital funds, 
business angels and venture capitalists once the workability of an alpha prototype had been 
demonstrated.  
The third generation starters in the period 1999-2002 were characterized by almost all 
being spin-offs and with a less mature technology, reflecting the increasing technology push 
model adopted by IMEC. During this period, IP was brought into the spin-off in exchange for 
equity. IMEC researchers involved in the research project were more likely to join the company, 
instead  of  remaining  an  employee  at  IMEC. The  mean  initial  capital  increased  significantly 
during this period although IMEC did not invest cash in its spin-offs at time of founding.  
Moray and Clarysse’s paper builds on existing research that demonstrates that PRIs may 
undertake  different  generic  approaches  to  spinning-out  new  ventures,  i.e.,  low  selective, 
supportive and incubator (Clarysse, Wright, Lockett, A., van de Elde and Vohora, 2005). IMEC   17 
is an interesting case where the PRI, in effect, became an incubator over time; the third phase 
outlined by Moray and Clarysse. Their research shows that the strategy of the PRI to become an 
incubator has an effect on the type of new ventures being created. 
Powers and McDougall (2005) test a model of a PRI’s selectivity and support policy 
orientation  for  technology  licensing  and  its  interaction  with  the  external  environment  for 
entrepreneurship.  Utilizing  previous  research  on  technology  transfer  practice,  combined  with 
contingency theory, they investigate the direct and interactive effects among a university’s policy 
orientation and a new composite measure of the external entrepreneurial environment in which a 
university  is  embedded,  entrepreneurial  density,  on  downstream  performance.    The  authors 
measure performance as the number of licensee firms that subsequently go public and product 
sale royalties.  Based on AUTM data from 134 U.S. research universities, data from IPO listing 
prospectuses, and additional private and governmental data sources, they estimate hierarchical 
moderated  regression  main,  two-way  and  three-way  interaction  effects  for  two  measures  of 
technology  transfer  performance  -  licenses  with  companies  that  subsequently  go  public  and 
product royalties.  
The authors find that both selectivity and entrepreneurial density are significant positive 
predictors of the number of licenses held with private companies that subsequently went public. 
However, a university’s selectivity and support orientation was not found to be significantly 
influenced by the density or sparseness of the external entrepreneurial environment.  Further, 
university technology transfer performance measured in terms of IPO firms did not appear to 
depend on the policy orientation, nor is that policy orientation significantly influenced by the 
external  environment  for  entrepreneurship.  With  respect  to  product  royalties,  they  find  that 
universities that are more selective about their choices for what to patent and license via the start-  18 
up and small company route appear to be especially disadvantaged in terms of royalty flows 
when they provide a high degree of support for their technology transfer program.  Conversely, 
universities that are less selective appear to be advantaged by a stronger support orientation.  For 
those universities in the middle third of the support range, an increase in selectivity results in a 
decreasing  royalty  benefit  up  to  a  point.    The  same  benefits  were  not  evident  for  those 
universities that pursue either a high selectivity and high support policy orientation or a low 
support and low selectivity policy orientation.  
Lockett and Wright (2005), utilizing data from a U.K. survey of all research universities 
that are active in spinning-out ventures and adopting count data analysis, while controlling for 
the presence of a medical school and regional R&D expenditure, address a key omission in the 
literature concerning the role of the resources and capabilities of universities and their TTO. The 
presence  of  sufficient  experience  and  expertise  within  what  are  historically  non-commercial 
environments  may  be  central to  their  ability  to generate  gains  from  spin-out  ventures.    The 
authors assert that it is important to distinguish between the roles of the stock of universities’ 
resource inputs and their routines/capabilities in affecting the creation of spin-out companies.  
The authors report that both the number of spin-out companies created and the number of 
spin-out companies created with equity investment are significantly positively associated with 
expenditure  on  intellectual  property  protection,  the  business  development  capabilities  of 
technology transfer offices and the royalty regime of the university. In contrast, they do not find 
that the number of start-ups is associated significantly with the number of TTO staff, the years 
the TTO has been in existence of the available technology.  
Markman, Gianiodis, and Phan (2005), using interview data from 91 university TTOs in 
the  U.S.,  supplemented  by  archival  data  on  commercialization  activity  and  university   19 
characteristics  from  other  sources,  assess  the  determinants  of  time  to  market  in  academic 
entrepreneurship.  Employing path analysis, incorporating hierarchical regressions, they find that 
the shorter the time to market, the greater the returns to the university and the higher the rate of 
startup formation.  They find that during the discovery and disclosure stage, TTO’s resources—
lack of time, capital, or poor central administration support for licensing activity—are less of a 
hindrance  to  speedy  commercialization  than  the  limitations  posed  by  inventor-related 
impediments such as resistance, indifference, and poor-quality disclosures.  However, during 
advanced  commercialization  stages,  faculty-inventors  seem  to  play  a  more  positive  role  in 
accelerating  the  process.    It  could  be  that  some  faculty-inventors  are  the  founders  of  these 
technology-based startups, which means that their interest in the new venture extends beyond the 
licensing process, involving the management of the commercialization process itself. 
Rothaermel and Thursby (2005) consider the importance for incubator firms of linkages 
to universities.  They focus on two types of university linkages: a license obtained from the 
university by the incubator firm and their links to faculty.  The authors propose that a university 
link to the sponsoring institution reduces the probability of new venture failure and, at the same 
time,  retards  timely  graduation.    Furthermore,  they  suggest  that  these  effects  are  more 
pronounced the stronger the university-incubator link.  
Their empirical analysis is based on detailed longitudinal data from 79 start-up firms 
incubated  in  the  Advanced  Technology  Development  Center  at  the  Georgia  Institute  of 
Technology over the six-year period between 1998 and 2003. They estimate multinomial logistic 
regressions, using maximum likelihood methods, to assess the determinants of three alternatives 
for these ventures: failure, remaining on the incubator, or successful graduation.    20 
The authors find that a new venture’s university linkages through a Georgia Tech license 
and/or  through  having  a  Georgia  Tech  professor  on  the  firm’s  management  senior  team 
significantly reduce the new venture’s chances of outright failure, but also significantly retard the 
firm’s graduation from the incubator.  They attribute the probability of reduced new venture 
failure to the venture being founded on a technology licensed from the university sponsoring the 
incubator, while retarded graduation stems from links to faculty from the incubator-sponsoring 
university.    The  authors  also  report  that  only  strong  ties  matter  when  predicting  graduation 
within three years or less.   
Ensley and Hmieleski (2005) analyze differences between firms that are spun out from 
university-affiliated business incubators and technology parks and those who emerge without 
such assistance.  The authors draw on institutional isomorphism theory to predict that university-
affiliated new venture top management teams (henceforth, TMTs) will be more homogenous in 
composition, display less developed team dynamics, and as a result, be lower performing than 
those without university affiliation.  They adopt the view that university-affiliated firms will 
institutionalize themselves toward the norms of the university and the successful ventures that 
have been launched through their nurturing, rather than toward their own industry, what they 
term “localized” isomorphic behavior.  The costs associated with localized isomorphism are used 
to explain why the benefits of university affiliation might fail to translate into performance gains. 
They test for differences in TMT composition (education, functional expertise, industry 
experience, and skill), dynamics (shared strategic cognition, potency, cohesion, and conflict) and 
performance (net cash flow and revenue growth) between a sample of 102 high-technology start-
ups that are affiliated with university incubators and technology parks and an observationally-
equivalent sample of 154 ventures that are unaffiliated with such facilities.  Using discriminant   21 
analysis and multiple regression, they find university-affiliated start-ups to be comprised of more 
homogenous  TMTs  with  less  developed  dynamics  than  their  unaffiliated  counterparts.  
Furthermore, university-affiliated start-ups are found to have significantly lower performance, in 
terms of net cash flow and revenue growth, than unaffiliated new ventures.   
The issue of geographic location is highlighted in two key papers. First, Link and Scott 
(2005) analyze the determinants of the new venture formation within university science parks (a 
property-based incubator). They focus on science parks because these institutions are designed to 
enhance knowledge spillovers between universities and tenant firms, and to enhance regional 
economic growth.  Adopting an institutional environment perspective, they conjecture that there 
are two critical factors that explain the rate of spin-off formation: the research environment of 
the university and the characteristics of the research park to which the spin-off companies locate. 
The authors conjecture that the more research intensive the university, the greater the 
probability  that  faculty  will  innovate;  and,  the  more  innovative  the  faculty,  the  greater  the 
probability that technologies will develop around which a spin-off company could be based. 
They also hypothesize that the formation of university spin-off companies into the university’s 
park  will  occur  more  often  in  older  parks  than  in  newer  ones  as  these  have  developed  the 
expertise to facilitate opportunity recognition and development.  To test these hypotheses, the 
authors  collected  survey  data  for  51  U.S.  research  parks,  which  they  supplemented  with 
interviews  of  provosts  at  these  institutions.    The  dependent  variable  in  their  analysis  is  the 
percentage  of  firms  on  the  park  that  are  university  spin-offs.    The  authors  employ  Tobit 
estimation and control for university and park characteristics.  The empirical results indicate that 
university spin-off companies are a greater proportion of the companies in older parks and in 
parks  that  are  associated  with  richer  university  research  environments.    They  also  find  that   22 
university  spin-off  companies  are  a  larger  proportion  of  companies  in  parks  that  are 
geographically closer to their university and in parks that have a biotechnology focus.  
  The  importance  of  location  is  also  examined  in  Audretsch,  Lehmann  and  Warning 
(2005), who assess the role of a firm’s choice of location as a firm strategy to exploit knowledge 
spillovers from universities. The authors hypothesize that proximity to the university is shaped 
by different spillover mechanisms -- research and human capital -- and by different types of 
knowledge  spillovers  --  natural  sciences  and  social  sciences.  Their  primary  source  of  data 
consists of 281 young high-technology start-ups that are publicly listed on the Neuer Markt in 
Germany between 1997 and 2002.  Data are also drawn from multiple archival sources, including 
listing prospectuses relating to the firms and government and other sources relating to university 
data.  
Based on OLS regressions, their results suggest that spillover mechanisms as well as 
spillover types are heterogeneous. More importantly, the authors find that firm spin-offs, at least 
in the knowledge and high technology sectors, are influenced not only by the traditional regional 
and economic characteristics, but also by the opportunity to access knowledge generated by 
universities.  However, the exact role that geographic proximity plays is shaped by the two 
factors  examined  in  this  paper  -  the  particular  knowledge  context,  and  the  specific  type  of 
spillover mechanism.  
In sum, contrary to conventional economic models researchers have found that the 
variation in relative TTO performance cannot be completely explained by environmental and 
institutional factors.   Instead, the extant literature on TTOs suggests that the key impediments to 
effective university technology transfer tend to be organizational in nature (Siegel, Waldman, 
and Link, 2003, Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link, 2003). These include problems with   23 
differences in organizational cultures between universities and (small) firms, incentive structures, 
including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards, such as credit towards tenure and 
promotion, and staffing and compensation practices of the TTO itself.   
 
IV. The Individual Contexts of University Technology Transfer 
Taking the analysis a level deeper, several studies have focused on individual scientists 
and entrepreneurs in the context of university technology transfer.  Audretsch (2000) examines 
the extent to which entrepreneurs at universities are different than other entrepreneurs.  He 
analyzes a dataset on university life scientists in order to estimate the determinants of the 
probability that they will establish a new biotechnology firm.  Based on a hazard function 
analysis, including controls for the quality of the scientist’s research, measures or regional 
activity in biotechnology, and a dummy for the career trajectory of the scientist, the author finds 
that university entrepreneurs tend to be older and more scientifically experienced.   
  The seminal papers by Lynne Zucker and Michael Darby and various collaborators 
explore the role of “star” scientists in the life sciences on the creation and location of new 
biotechnology firms in the U.S. and Japan.  In Zucker, Darby and Armstrong (2000), the authors 
assessed the impact of these university scientists on the research productivity of U.S. firms.  
Some of these scientists resigned from the university to establish a new firm or kept their faculty 
position, but worked very closely with industry scientists.  A star scientist is defined as a 
researcher who has discovered over 40 genetic sequences, and affiliations with firms are defined 
through co-authoring between the star scientist and industry scientists.  Research productivity is 
measured using three proxies: number of patents granted, number of products in development, 
and number of products on the market.  They find that ties between star scientists and firm   24 
scientists have a positive effect on these three dimensions of research productivity, as well as 
other aspects of firm performance and rates of entry in the U.S. biotechnology industry (Zucker, 
Darby, and Armstrong, 1998; Zucker, Darby, and Brewer, 1998). 
  In Zucker and Darby (2001), the authors examine detailed data on the outcomes of 
collaborations between “star” university scientists and biotechnology firms in Japan.  Similar 
patterns emerge in the sense that they find that such interactions substantially enhance the 
research productivity of Japanese firms, as measured by the rate of firm patenting, product 
innovation, and market introductions of new products.  However, they also report an absence of 
geographically localized knowledge spillovers resulting from university technology transfer in 
Japan, in contrast to the U.S., where they found that such effects were strong.  The authors 
attribute this result to the following interesting institutional difference between Japan and the U.S 
in university technology transfer.  In the U.S., it is common for academic scientists to work with 
firm scientists at the firm’s laboratories.  In Japan, firm scientists typically work in the academic 
scientist’s laboratory.   Thus, according to the authors, it is not surprising that the local economic 
development impact of university technology transfer appears to be lower in Japan than in the 
U.S.     
Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, and Stoto (1989) analyze the propensity of life-science faculty 
to engage in various aspects of technology transfer, including commercialization.  Their 
statistical sample consists of life scientists at the 50 research universities that received the most 
funding from the National Institutes of Health.  The authors find that the most important 
determinant of involvement in technology commercialization was local group norms.  They 
report that university policies and structures had little effect on this activity.     25 
The unit of analysis in Bercovitz and Feldman (2004) was also the individual faculty 
member.  They analyze the propensity of medical school researchers at Johns Hopkins and Duke 
to file invention disclosures, a potential precursor to technology commercialization.  The authors 
find that three factors influence the decision to disclose inventions: norms at the institutions 
where the researchers were trained and the disclosure behaviors of their department chairs and 
peers, respectively. Related to this research, Roberts and Malone (1996), using the example of 
Stanford in the early 1990s, conjecture that technology transfer stimulated entrepreneurial 
activity was a function of university policies (Stanford refused to grant exclusive licenses to 
inventor-founders).  DiGregorio and Shane (2003) directly assess the determinants of startup 
formation using AUTM data from 101 universities and 530 startups.  Based on estimates of 
count regressions of the number of university-based startups, they conclude that the two key 
determinants of startups are faculty quality and the ability of the university and inventor(s) to 
assume equity in a start-up in lieu of licensing royalty fees.   
In sum, to the extent that the successful commercialization of university technology 
depends on the individual incentives, risk taking propensities, and skill sets of academic 
entrepreneurs, the research seems to suggest that paying attention to the individual level of 
analysis matters in building more complete models of technology transfer effectiveness.  
Specifically, the ability for academics to identify commercial opportunities is driven by their 
technical expertise, experience in past commercialization attempts, and their personal networks 
outside the university context.  Their willingness to engage in such activities is primarily related 
to the incentives they are offered and/or the perceived risk/return outcomes. 
 
   26 
V. Measuring the Effectiveness of University Technology Transfer (Licensing and Business 
Formation) 
 
  A useful way to assess and explain the effectiveness of university technology transfer is 
to model this within a production function/frontier framework.  Such a production function is 
typically estimated econometrically.  Production frontiers are also estimated using nonparametric 
models, which offer some advantages, relative to the parametric approach.   For instance, these 
methods obviate the need to specify a functional form for the production frontier and also enable 
us to identify “best practice” universities.  Nonparametric techniques can also handle multiple 
outputs.  
  Perhaps the most popular non-parametric estimation technique is data envelopment 
analysis (DEA).  The DEA method is essentially a linear-program, which can be expressed as 
follows:  
                              s              m 
(1)  Max hk =  Σ  urkYrk / Σ  vikXik 




              s              m 
(2)         Σ  urkYrj / Σ  vikXij < 1; j=1,..., n 
            r=1          i=1 
                  




       Y = a vector of outputs 
       X = a vector of inputs  
        i  = inputs  (m inputs) 
        r  = outputs (s outputs) 
        n = # of decision-making units (DMUs), or the unit of observation in a DEA 
              study  
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  The unit of observation in a DEA study is referred to as the decision-making unit (DMU).  
A maintained assumption of this class of models is that DMUs attempt to maximize efficiency.  
Input-oriented DEA yields an efficiency “score,” bounded between 0 and 1, for each DMU by 
choosing weights (ur and vi) that maximize the ratio of a linear combination of the unit's outputs 
to a linear combination of its inputs (see equation (2)).  These scores are often expressed as 
percentages.  A DMU having a score of 1 is efficient, while those with scores of less than one are 
(relatively) inefficient.  Multiple DMUs have scores of 1.   
  DEA fits a piecewise linear surface to rest on top of the observations.  This is referred to 
as the "efficient frontier."  The efficiency of each DMU is measured relative to all other DMUs, 
with the constraint that all DMU's lie on or below the efficient frontier.  The linear programming 
technique identifies best practice DMUs, or those that are on the frontier.  All other DMUs are 
viewed as being inefficient relative to the frontier DMUs.  
  Stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) is a parametric method developed by Aigner, Lovell 
and Schmidt (1977) and Meeusen and Van den Broeck (1977).  SFE generates a production (or 
cost) frontier with a stochastic error term that consists of two components: a conventional 
random error (“white noise”) and a term that represents deviations from the frontier, or relative 
inefficiency.  Following Battese and Coelli (1995), the stochastic frontier model in cross 
sectional form is: 
 
(3)   ) exp( i i i i U V x Y ! + = "                  
 
where Yi represents the output or production of the i-th observation (i=1,2,…N).; xi is a (1 x k) 
vector of values of inputs or resources used in production; and i denotes the i-th firm. β is a (k x   28 
1) vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The Vis are assumed to be iid N(0,
2
V ! ) random 
errors,  distributed  independently  of  the  Uis.  The  Uis  are  the  non-negative  random  variables 
associated with technical inefficiency of production, which are assumed to be independently 
distributed, such that Ui is obtained by truncation (at zero) of the normal distribution with a mean 
ziδ and a variance, σ
2.  Zi is a (1 x m) vector of explanatory variables associated with technical 
inefficiency of the production of observations and finally δ is an (1 x m) vector of unknown 
coefficients. 
  Equation (3) specifies the stochastic frontier production function in terms of the original 
production values.  In order to explain technical efficiency, this model needs to be extended to 
make technical efficiency conditional on exogenous variables.  Following Battese and Coelli 
(1995), we can model explanatory variables in a one stage SFE model.  That is, the technical 
inefficiency effects, the Uis, are assumed to be a function of a set of explanatory variables, the zis 
and the unknown vector of coefficients δ.  If all the elements of the δ vector are equal to 0, then 
the  technical  inefficiency  effects  are  not  related  to  the  z  variables,  and  so  the  half  normal 
distribution specified in Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) is obtained.   
  The technical inefficiency effect, Uit, in the stochastic frontier model (3) can be specified 
as: 
 
(4)  i i i W z U + = !      
 
where the random variable, Wi  is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with zero 
mean and variance, σ
2.   29 
  The method of maximum likelihood is used for the simultaneous estimation of the parameters 
of the stochastic frontier model and the model for the technical inefficiency effects.  The likelihood 
function is expressed in terms of the variance parameters, 
2 2 2
U V S ! ! ! + "   and 
2 2
S U ! ! " # . Therefore 
γ is the ratio of the standard error of technical inefficiency to the standard error of statistical noise, 
and is bounded between 0 and 1. Note that γ = 0 under the null hypothesis of an absence of 
inefficiency, indicating that all of the variance can be attributed to statistical noise.  The technical 
efficiency of production for the i-th observation is defined by: 
(5)  ) exp( ) exp( i i i i W z U TE ! ! = ! = "               
  Choosing between the parametric stochastic frontier estimation (SFE) and the non-
parametric data envelopment analysis (DEA) is not without controversy (Gong and Sickles, 
1993).  A main attraction of stochastic frontier analysis is that it allows hypothesis testing and 
construction of confidence intervals.  A drawback of the approach, however, is the need to 
assume a functional form for the production function and for the distribution of the technical 
efficiency term.  The use of DEA obviates the need to make these assumptions and, as noted 
earlier, also allows for multiple outputs in the production function.  However, a major weakness 
of DEA is that it is deterministic.  Hence, DEA does not distinguish between technical 
inefficiency and noise.   
  Chapple, Lockett, Siegel, and Wright (2006) assert that the technology transfer is 
characterized by multiple outputs: licensing and start-up activity.  With multiple outputs, it is 
appropriate to employ a “distance” function approach, which can be considered as a 
generalization of the single output production (or cost) frontier.  Distance functions can be 
estimated using non-parametric or parametric methods.  A simple parametric distance function 
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Hence, if we arbitrarily choose one of the outputs, such as the Mth output, and set ω=1/YM, we 
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where y*= ym/yM 
and the distance function can be expressed more concisely as: 
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Thus, if we append a symmetric error term, v to account for statistical noise and re-write ln(Do) 
as µ, we can obtain the stochastic output distance function, with the usual composite error  term ε   31 
=v+ µ.  We make the standard assumptions that the v are normally distributed random variables 
while the µ are assumed to have at truncated normal distribution: 
 
ln( ) ( , / , , ) M M y CD x y y v ! " µ # = + #    (12) 
 
As in the stochastic frontier approach, the predicted value of the output distance function for the 
i
th firm, Doi = exp(-µ) is not directly observable but must be derived from the composed error 
term, εi..   Therefore, predictions for Do are obtained using Coelli’s Frontier 4.1 program, based 
on the conditional expectation Doi=E[(-µ) εi]. 
We now turn to some specific productivity studies.  Referring to Table 1, we note that 
effectiveness usually refers to a measure of “productivity,” which are constructed from indicators 
of “outputs” and “inputs” of university technology transfer (e.g., Siegel, Waldman, and Link, 
2003; Thursby and Thursby, 2002; Friedman and Silberman, 2003; and Chapple, Lockett, Siegel, 
and Wright, 2005).  Some of these productivity studies are based on non-parametric methods, 
such as data envelopment analysis (henceforth, DEA), a linear programming method.  Others 
employ parametric estimation procedures, such as stochastic frontier estimation (henceforth, 
SFE).  
Siegel, Waldman, and Link (2003) employ SFE to assess and “explain” the relative 
productivity of 113 U.S. university TTOs.  In their model, licensing activity is treated as the 
output and invention disclosures, full-time equivalent employees in the TTO, and legal 
expenditures are considered to be inputs.  They find that the production function model yields a 
good fit.  Based on estimates of their “marginal product,” it appears that technology licensing 
officers add significant value to the commercialization process.  The findings also imply that   32 
spending more on lawyers reduces the number of licensing agreements but increases licensing 
revenue.  Licensing revenue is subject to increasing returns, while licensing agreements are 
characterized by constant returns to scale.  An implication of increasing returns for licensing 
revenue is that a university wishing to maximize revenue should spend more on lawyers.  
Perhaps this would enable university licensing officers to devote more time to eliciting additional 
invention disclosures and less time to negotiating with firms. 
While licensing has traditionally been the most popular mechanism for 
commercialization of university-based technologies, universities are increasingly emphasizing 
the entrepreneurial dimension of technology transfer (see Table 2).  The Association of 
University Technology Managers (AUTM, 2004) reports that the number of startup firms at U.S. 
universities rose from 35 in 1980 to 374 in 2003. This rapid increase in startup activity has 
attracted considerable attention in the academic literature.  Some researchers have focused on the 
university as the unit of analysis, while others analyze entrepreneurial agents (either academic or 
non-academic entrepreneurs). 
Franklin, Wright, and Lockett (2001) conclude that the best approach for universities that 
wish to launch successful technology transfer startups is a combination of academic and 
surrogate entrepreneurship.  This would enable universities to simultaneously exploit the 
technical benefits of inventor involvement and the commercial know-how of surrogate 
entrepreneurs.  In a subsequent paper, Lockett, Wright and Franklin (2003) find that universities 
that generate the most startups have clear, well-defined strategies regarding the formation and 
management of spinouts.  These schools tend to use surrogate (external) entrepreneurs, rather 
than academic entrepreneurs, to manage this process.  It also appears as though the more 
successful universities have greater expertise and vast social networks that help them generate   33 
more startups.  However, the role of the academic inventor was not found to differ between the 
more and less successful universities.  Finally, equity ownership was found to be more widely 
distributed among the members of the spinout company in the case of the more successful 
universities.   
  Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2005) develop a model linking university 
patents to new-firm creation in university-based incubators, with university TTOs acting as the 
intermediaries.  While there have been some qualitative studies of university originated new 
business formation (e.g. Bercovitz Feldman, Feller, and Burton, 2001; Siegel, Waldman, and 
Link, 2003; Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, and Ziedonis, 2001), they have been based on data from 
elite research universities only (e.g. Stanford, UC Berkeley, and MIT) or from a small sample of 
more representative institutions.  To build a theoretically saturated model of TTOs’ 
entrepreneurial development strategies, the authors collected qualitative and quantitative data 
from virtually the entire population of university TTOs.  In a subsequent paper, Markman, 
Gianiodis and Phan (2006) found that entrepreneurial activity was positively correlated to gray 
market activities, which raises a conundrum for university administrators interested in pursuing 
greater level of entrepreneurial intensity.  
  Nerkar and Shane (2003) analyze the entrepreneurial dimension of university technology 
transfer, based on an empirical analysis of 128 firms that were founded between 1980 and 1996 
to commercialize inventions owned by MIT.  They begin by noting that there is an extensive 
literature in management that suggests that new technology firms are more likely to survive if 
they exploit radical technologies (e.g, Tushman and Anderson, 1986) and if they possess patents 
with a broad scope (e.g., Merges and Nelson, 1990).  The authors conjecture that the 
relationships between radicalness and survival and scope and survival are moderated both by the   34 
market structure or level of concentration in the firm’s industry.  Specifically, they assert that 
radicalness and patent scope increase the probability of survival more in fragmented industries 
than in concentrated sectors.  They estimate a hazard function model using the MIT database and 
find empirical support for these hypotheses.  Thus, the effectiveness of the technology strategies 
of new firms may be dependent on industry conditions.  
Technology incubators are university-based technology initiatives that are designed to 
facilitate knowledge transfer from the university to firms located on such facilities.  Rothaermel 
and Thursby (2005) investigate the research question of how knowledge actually flows from 
universities  to  incubator  firms.    The  authors  assess  the  effect  of  these  knowledge  flows  on 
incubator firm-level differential performance.  Based on the resource-based view of the firm and 
the  absorptive  capacity  construct,  they  hypothesize  that  knowledge  flows  should  enhance 
incubator firm performance.  Drawing on detailed, longitudinal firm-level data on 79 technology 
ventures incubated between 1998 and 2003 at the Advanced Technology Development Center, a 
technology incubator sponsored by the Georgia Institute of Technology, the authors find some 
support for knowledge flows from universities to incubator firms.  Their evidence suggests that 
incubator  firms’  absorptive  capacity  is  an  important  factor  when  transforming  university 
knowledge into firm-level competitive advantage. 
The transfer of scientific and technological know-how into valuable economic activity 
has become a high priority for many nations and regions. The emphasis on the role and the 
nature of “industry science links” during this transfer process is an important dimension of this 
emerging  policy  orientation.      Debackere  and  Veugelers  (2005)  explore  the  diverse  and 
evolutionary nature of industry science links, as well as the major motivations driving them. The   35 
establishment of technology transfer offices can be seen as providing both a strategic and a 
structural response towards embedding industry science links within academic institutions.  
  The authors explore the case of K.U. Leuven R&D, the technology transfer organization 
affiliated with K.U. Leuven in Belgium, as well as a comparison group of 11 European research 
universities.  They identify numerous factors influencing the management of technology transfer 
relationships.  Consistent with evidence from the U.S. (see Link and Siegel (2005)), they find 
that incentives and organization practices are important, in terms of explaining variation in 
relative performance.   Specifically, they report that universities allocating a higher percentage of 
royalty payments to faculty members tend to be more effective in technology transfer.  On the 
organizational side, the authors find that another critical success factor is what they call a 
“decentralized management style,” which apparently allows the technology transfer office to be 
much more sensitive to the needs of its stakeholders.    
  Audretsch and Lehmann (2005) examine the success of technical universities in 
facilitating the spillover and commercialization of knowledge by firms. The authors compare the 
impact of technical and general universities on the performance of knowledge-based firms.  
Technical universities are expected to have a stronger impact than general universities in 
stimulating such spillovers.  These institutions, which were established in Germany in the mid-
nineteenth century, focus on science engineering.  They have received more research grants and 
state funding, compared to general universities. 
  The authors test the hypothesis of differential impact based on a unique data set, 
consisting of publicly-held high technology firms in Germany.  Interestingly, the authors report 
that firm performance is not influenced by the type of university it interacts with.  That is,   36 
technical universities do not have a differential impact on firm performance, relative to more 
general universities.   
  Chapple, Lockett, Siegel, and Wright (2005) extends previous research on the relative 
performance of university technology transfer offices (Thursby and Kemp (2002) and Siegel, 
Waldman, and Link (2003)) in two important ways.  First, the authors report the first evidence 
based on data from university technology transfer offices in the U.K.  A second contribution is 
that they simultaneously employ parametric and non-parametric methods, which provides for 
more accurate and robust measurement and "explanation" of relative productivity.  Specifically, 
they compare and contrast stochastic frontier estimation and data envelopment analysis.   
  Several stylized facts emerge from their empirical analysis.  Relative to the U.S., they 
find much greater variation in relative performance in technology transfer across U.K. 
universities using both non-parametric and parametric approaches.  More importantly, in contrast 
to the U.S., they find decreasing returns to scale to licensing activity and relatively low levels of 
absolute efficiency at U.K. universities.  This indicates that substantial improvements can be 
made with respect to the efficiency of U.K. technology transfer offices. Consistent with U.S. 
evidence, the authors find that organizational and environmental factors explain substantial 
variation in relative performance.  Specifically, they report that older TTOs are less productive 
than comparable institutions, suggesting an absence of learning effects.  Universities located in 
regions with higher levels of R&D and GDP appear to be more efficient, implying that there may 
be regional spillovers in technology transfer.  
  Link and Scott (2005) investigate the conditions when a research joint venture (RJV) will 
involve a university as a research partner.  They hypothesize that larger RJVs are more likely to 
invite a university to join the venture as a research partner than smaller RJVs because larger   37 
ventures are less likely to expect substantial additional appropriability problems to result because 
of the addition of a university partner and because the larger ventures have both a lower marginal 
cost and a higher marginal value from university R&D contributions to the ventures’ innovative 
output.  The authors test this hypothesis using data from the National Science Foundation 
sponsored CORE database, and those data confirm the hypothesis. 
 
VI. Lessons Learned: Normative Applications 
Our framework for considering lessons learned is presented in Figure 1.  Recall that in 
the introductory section of the paper we asserted that the effectiveness of university technology 
transfer should be considered within three contexts: the institutional, organizational, and 
individual contexts of this activity.  Figure 1 suggests that these three contexts are related. 
Hence, all three elements must be consistent for technology transfer to be successful, 
however success is defined by the university and its related stakeholders.  For example, research 
by Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis (2005), which echoes much of the extant literature, 
demonstrates that having well intended institutional policies regarding business formation is not 
sufficient.  It has to be supported by the appropriate organizational design choices and further 
back-stopped by the correct blend of incentives to both the inventors and TTO officers.   
 
 
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
 
   38 
Our review leads us to the normative conclusion that for technology transfer to succeed, 
it is critical for university administrators to think strategically about the process.  Much of the 
research makes clear that university administrators are often more concerned about protecting 
intellectual property rights and appropriating the fruits of technology transfer than they are about 
creating the appropriate context or environment in which such activities are to take place.  This 
implies that they must address numerous formulation and implementation issues, which we now 
consider in turn.    
A key formulation issue is the establishment of institutional goals and priorities, which 
must be transparent, forthright, and reflected in resource allocation patterns.  Establishing 
priorities also relates to strategic choices regarding technological emphasis (e.g. life sciences vs. 
engineering and the physical sciences) for the generation of licensing and startup opportunities.   
Opportunities for technology commercialization and the propensity of faculty members to 
engage in technology transfer vary substantially across fields both between and within the life 
sciences and physical sciences.  Universities must also be mindful of competition from other 
institutions when confronting these choices.  For example, many universities have recently 
launched initiatives in the life sciences and biotechnology, with high expectations regarding 
enhanced revenue and job creation through technology transfer.  It is conceivable that any 
potential financial gains from these fields may be limited.    
Resource allocation decisions must also be driven by strategic choices the university 
makes regarding various modes of technology transfer.  As noted previously, these modes are 
licensing, startups, sponsored research and other mechanisms of technology transfer that are 
focused more directly on stimulating economic and regional development, such as incubators 
and science parks.  Licensing and sponsored research generate a stream of revenue, while equity   39 
from startups could yield a payoff in the long-term.  Universities that stress economic 
development outcomes are advised to focus on startups since these companies can potentially 
create jobs in the local region or state.  Note also that while a startup strategy entails higher risk, 
since the failure rate of new firms is quite high, it also can potentially generate high returns if the 
startup is taken public.  It is also important to note that a startup strategy entails additional 
resources, if the university chooses to assist the academic entrepreneur in launching and 
developing their startup.   
Organizational incentives are also important.  The evidence implies that shifting the 
royalty distribution formula in favor of faculty members (e.g., allowing faculty members to 
retain 75% of the revenue, instead of 33% of the revenue) would elicit more invention 
disclosures are greater efficiency in technology transfer.  A more controversial recommendation 
is to modify promotion and tenure guidelines to place a more positive weight on technology 
transfer activities in such decisions.  Clearly, this is a matter that touches the very core of what it 
means to be an academic researcher and therefore impinges on issues of norms and shared 
values.  However, while we do not underestimate the difficulty, and indeed the appropriateness, 
with which norms, standards, and values among tenured faculty can be changed, such changes 
are necessary at institutions that wish to place a high priority on technology commercialization. 
A more simply recommendation is to switch from standard compensation to incentive 
compensation for technology licensing officers could also result in more licensing agreements.   
The extant research also clearly demonstrates the importance of the effective 
implementation of technology transfer strategies.    Examples of implementation issues include 
choices regarding information flows, organizational design/structure, human resources 
management practices in the TTO, and reward systems for faculty involvement in technology   40 
transfer.  There are also a set of implementation issues relating to different modes of technology 
transfer, licensing, start-ups, sponsored research, and other modes that are focused more directly 
on stimulating economic development, such as incubators and science parks.  We now consider 
each of these in turn, in the context of the quantitative and qualitative analyses cited in previous 
sections of the paper. 
We suggest that for university administrators to fruitfully deal with the implementation 
issues, they should adopt a value chain perspective of technology transfer. In a corporate setting, 
the production function is conceptualized as a chain of value adding activities linked by cross 
functional processes, information flows, material flows, and risk flows.  Seen this way, the 
production function can be reengineered, reordered, resequenced, and even cut short.  Similarly, 
value adding activities can also be sliced into smaller pieces and hived off to partners, suppliers 
and customers.  In the same manner, a university’s technology licensing process need not remain 
exclusively in-house.  It is seldom that there is sufficient, technical, legal and managerial 
expertise in a TTO to manage the scope and depth of technologies and potential technology 
customers that emanate from a university’s laboratories.  Hence, by dicing up the set of activities 
related to technology transfer, from technology identification and selection to technology 
customer matching, a university can concentrate on those activities it is best equipped to manage 
and partner with resource providers and outside experts for those areas that it cannot or should 
not expend resources to build.   
For example, human resource management practices appear to be quite important.  
Several qualitative studies (e.g. Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, and Link, 2004) indicate that there 
are deficiencies in the TTO, with respect to marketing skills and entrepreneurial experience.  
Unfortunately, field research (e.g., Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis, 2005a) has also   41 
revealed TTOs are not actively recruiting individuals with such skills and experience. Instead, 
representative institutions appear to be focusing on expertise in patent law and licensing or 
technical expertise.   
One method of dealing with this problem is to enhance training and development 
programs for TTO personnel, along with additional administrative support for this activity, since 
many TTOs lack sufficient resources and competencies to identify the most commercially viable 
inventions.  Training in portfolio management techniques would be extremely useful in this 
context.  Selection, training, and development of TTO personnel with such portfolio 
management skills are necessary if the screening mechanism is to be improved.  Furthermore, 
incentives should be directed towards creating immediate feedback and rewards (i.e. cash) to 
motivate TTO personnel to improve their expertise through training.   
Another solution, taking a value chain approach, is to partner with technology experts in 
corporations or consulting firms.  Research has shown that career opportunities for university 
technology licensing officers are limited and often of short duration (Siegel, Waldman, Atwater, 
and Link, 2004; Markman, Phan, Balkin, and Giannodis, 2004a), which implies recruiting 
appropriate talent is at best a stochastic outcome.   
We have shown that organizational incentives are important.  The evidence implies that 
shifting the royalty distribution formula in favor of faculty members (e.g., allowing faculty 
members to retain 75% of the revenue, instead of 33% of the revenue) would elicit more 
invention disclosures are greater efficiency in technology transfer.  A more controversial 
recommendation is to modify promotion and tenure guidelines to place a more positive weight 
on technology transfer activities in such decisions.  We believe that such changes are warranted 
at institutions that wish to place a high priority on technology commercialization, although we do   42 
not underestimate the difficulty of changing norms, standards, and values among entrenched 
tenured faculty.  Finally, a switch from standard compensation to incentive compensation for 
technology licensing officers could also result in more licensing agreements.   
Finally, the extant research suggests that improving information flows between 
academics and the university administration matters to technology transfer effectiveness.  In the 
first instance, technology licensing officers and university administrators share an interest in 
promoting technology commercialization and therefore should devote more effort to eliciting 
invention disclosures.  While part of the problem with poor disclosure outcomes has to do with 
faculty incentives (publications are usually regarded as mutually exclusive to patents), we 
surmise from the research that a greater part has to do with the lack of formal and rich 
communication channels between the university laboratories and the TTO.   
Maintaining communication bandwidth is resource intensive (in time) for the researcher.  
The filing reports and giving seminars to potential technology licensees is usually a strong 
deterrent to faculty, even if they are interested in profiting from their discoveries.  The 
opportunity costs are such (by some estimates, 8 peer reviewed papers for each patent filed) that 
the ‘hurdle rate’ for an embryonic discovery would be so high as to minimize potential 
blockbusters that would only be apparent with additional, usually incremental, research.  Hence, 
the institution must be prepared to bear the costs of maintaining communication, such as 
providing administrative support within the individual laboratories to manage information flows 
and paperwork for licensing projects.  Related to this, it is also important to provide information 
and support for faculty members who express an interest in forming a start-up.  Given that 
business formation requires skills that academic scientists typically do not possess and they 
involve activities that are somewhat alien to their culture (e.g., assessing market demand for their   43 
invention), universities could partner with and reward business school faculty to train and mentor 
potential academic entrepreneurs.   
 
VII. Lessons Learned: Theoretical Implications 
  Our review clearly suggests some theoretical frameworks that can be applied to 
furthering the research in this field.  Because the work is still relatively nascent, much of it has 
been descriptive and approached from the perspective of inventorying the phenomenon.  
However, we have also reviewed good examples of theoretically based approaches.  For 
example, the notion of path dependency goes a long way to explain the persistence difference in 
commercialization success rate between experienced universities and those that are knew to the 
game.  In contrast to phenomena that can be described by productivity frontiers, there does not 
appear to be evidence of a ‘regression to the mean’ (or decreasing returns) in technology transfer.  
One reason may be that we have not been able to measure over a long enough time period but a 
more compelling rationale may be that TTOs, over time, learn how to do this well and to the 
extent that such learnings become embedded in an institutional context, can distance themselves 
from those that are new to the activity.  In addition, because of the geographically localized 
nature of successful technology transfer, it appears that the situations into which such expertise 
can be successfully transplanted may be limited. Hence, the use of institutional theory and 
evolutionary economics perspectives to explain the persistence of differences in effectiveness 
across regions may be a fruitful direction in which to take the research related to regional 
development and university technology transfer. 
  At the level of the organization, our review has been clear that the consistency and 
congruency of organization design, incentive systems, information process capacity, and   44 
organization-wide values matter a great deal in technology transfer success and new venture 
creation.  Employ well received theory from the organization sciences, such as the resource 
based view of the firm, structural contingency theory, and social network theory may provide 
excellent foundations for deriving even more sophisticated insights in future research, 
particularly because the phenomenon is going international and therefore, attempts to generalize 
theory must take a more systematic tact than has heretofore been employed in the literature.  In 
particular, if we are careful to define the dependent variable as an economic outcome 
(technological commercialization) of a largely socio-psychological phenomenon (university 
scientists discovering knowledge), we should be able to apply standard organization theories in 
the non-profit setting of a university. 
  At the individual level of analysis, there is an emerging literature that attempts to model 
the TTO-scientist and TTO-university relationship from an agency theory perspective.  This is a 
highly useful direction to pursue, which we believe can be taken a step further.  Assumptions 
relating to principal-agent decisions are based largely on Bayesian rationality.  Based on recent 
research on prospect theory, we can incorporate the notion of prior losses or gains into the choice 
models (e.g., to faculty member‘s decision to disclose or not to disclose an invention, to license 
or not license a technology; or to launch a new venture or not) to the problem of opportunity 
costs faced by the scientists and transactions costs faced by the university and/or commercial 
enterprise.  The specificity with which we can theoretically specify the TTO relationships will 
allow us to seek latent constructs that determine the institutional, organizational and individual 
relationships to technology transfer effectiveness, and hence build more predictive normative 
models.   
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VIII. Conclusions 
In the aftermath of the Bayh-Dole Act, other supporting legislation, and an increase in 
public–private research partnerships, there has been a rapid increase in technology 
commercialization at universities.  Universities are now in the business of managing intellectual 
property portfolios and are often aggressively attempting to commercialize discoveries from their 
laboratories.  This activity is driven, in part, by anecdotes relating to the financial promise of 
university technology transfer, i.e., the lucrative stream of licensing revenue and IPO-related 
wealth resulting from Internet search engines and browsers, Gatorade, gene sequencing, and drug 
discovery.  Universities have also been compelled, especially in the U.K., to pursue 
commercialization due to shrinking endowments, reductions in government funding, and 
increased operating costs.   
Unfortunately, for many institutions, “success” in university technology transfer has not 
been achieved.  In an effort to improve our understanding of why such efforts have failed, we 
presented an extensive review and synthesis of much of the more notable recent research on 
universities technology transfer.  Our contribution is to offer a systematic framework for 
considering the issues to university administrators, policymakers, and economists.  
This framework has also allowed us to draw some preliminary normative conclusions 
about what is required for success in technology transfer.  Generally, our conclusion, as 
expressed in Figure 1, consists of three parts.  There are clearly defined institutional, 
organizational and individual factors to be considered simultaneously when trying to understand 
why technology transfer works or does not work.  Second, although these factors appear to be 
common across universities, the importance to which they matter for effectiveness at a   46 
particularly university is likely to vary by the history, academic value system, and technological 
depth of the institution.   
Third, it is important to note that the “outputs” of university technology transfer depend 
on the quantity and quality of discoveries.  This highlights the importance of the “suppliers” of 
new technologies-the faculty members who conduct research in the laboratory and (in theory) 
disclose inventions to the TTO.  As universities strive to improve the success rate of their 
commercialization activities, they must preserve the inquiry-based research environment that 
currently exists in the university laboratory.  The substitution of less risky, applied research for 
high risk, basic research would result in fewer “home-run” commercializable inventions, which 
would be inconsistent with the culture of entrepreneurship necessary for new business formation.  
Finally, in order to further advance the extant literature, we encourage researchers to 
consider applying systematic theoretical frameworks in describing the relationships presented in 
Figure 1.  More specifically, we believe that by employing theoretical perspectives appropriate to 
the three levels of analyses and by improving our specification of the dependent variable, even 
more nuanced policy recommendations can result from the research.  The importance of this 
extension cannot be understated, as the phenomenon of university technology transfer goes 
global and the competition for ideas, resources and licensing revenues accelerates with the 
participation of foreign governments and non-governmental advocacy organizations.  The 
promise of university technology transfer may indeed someday be achieved.  47 
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Table 1 
Quantitative and Qualitative Research on the Effectiveness of  
Licensing of University-Based Inventions in the U.S. and U.K.  
 
Author(s)  Data Sets  Methodology  Key Findings 







Faculty Involvement in the Licensing of a 
University-Based Technology Increases the 



















Inventions Tend to Disclosed At An Early 
Stage of Development; Elasticities of 
Licenses and Royalties With Respect to 
Invention Disclosures Are Both Less Than 
One; Faculty Members Are Increasingly 













Analysis of Different Organization Structures 
for Technology Transfer at Duke, Johns 
Hopkins, and Penn State; Differences in 
























Faculty Quality and # of TTO Staff Has a 
Positive Impact on Licensing; Private 
Universities Appear To Be More Efficient 
Than Public Universities; Universities With 


















Higher Royalty Shares For Faculty Members 











Research Expenditure, Invention Disclosures, 
and Age of TTO Have a Positive Impact on 



























TTOs Exhibit Constant Returns to Scale With 
Respect to the # of Licensing; Increasing 
Returns to Scale With Respect to Licensing 
Revenue; Organizational and Environmental 















Higher Royalty Shares For Faculty Members 
Are Associated  With Higher  
Licensing Income 
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Quantitative and Qualitative Research on the Effectiveness of  
Licensing of University-Based Inventions in the U.S. and U.K.  
 




















 U.K. TTOs Exhibit Decreasing Returns to 
Scale and Low Levels of Effectiveness;  
Organizational and Environmental Factors Have 




















Land Grant Universities Are More Efficient 
in University Technology Licensing; Higher 
Royalty Shares For Faculty Members Are 
Higher Levels of Effectiveness in University 


















Case Studies  
Universities Allocating a Higher Percentage 
of Royalty Payments to Faculty Members 
Tend to be More Effective in Technology 
Transfer.  A Critical Success Factor is What 
They Call a “Decentralized  
















U.S. Universities Are More Efficient than 
U.K. Universities; TTOs Exhibit Decreasing 
or Constant Returns to Scale. Universities 
With Medical Schools And Incubators Are 
Closer to Frontier 
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Table 2  
Selected Studies of Science Parks in the U.S. and U.K. 
 






















On and Off 
Science Parks 










Analysis of the 










No Difference in the Survival Rates of Firms 
Located on University Science Parks and 























On and Off 
Science Parks 






















Sponsored Science Park Environments Did 
Not Significantly Increase the Probability of 






















On and Off 
Science Parks 





















No Difference in  Employment Growth Rates 
of Firms Located on University Science Parks 
and Similar Firms Not Located on University 
Science Parks  
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Selected Studies of Science Parks in the U.S. and U.K. 
 






















On and Off 
Science Parks 





















Science Park firms are More Efficient Than 
Non-Science Park Firms in Research (i.e., 



































Real Estate Parks Are The Fastest Growing 
Type of Park, But Their Growth Is Not 































































Proximity to a University and the Availability 
of Venture Capital Have a Positive Impact on 
Growth;   Science Park Enables Universities 
to Generate More Publications and Patents, 
More Easily Place Graduates, and Hire 
Preeminent Scholars   58 
Table 2 (cont.) 
Selected Studies of Science Parks in the U.S. and U.K. 
 



































There is a Positive Association Between the 
% of University-Based Start-ups and the Age 
of the Park, the Quality of the Research 
Environment at the University, Proximity to 






Link and Scott 
(2006) 
Authors’ 
Survey of U.S. 
Science parks, 
Supplemented 









The Following Factors Are Associated With 
Science Park Growth: Proximity to the 
University, Whether the Park is Managed by a 
Private Organization, Whether the Park Has a 
Focus on Information Technology 
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Table 3  
 Quantitative and Qualitative Research on University-Based  
Entrepreneurial Activity in the U.S. and U.K. 
 


























Key Determinant of Faculty-Based 
Entrepreneurship: Local Group Norms; 
University Policies and Structures  





























on Biotech Firms 
from the North 
Carolina 
Biotechnology 














Location of Star Scientists Predicts Firm Entry 





























on Biotech Firms 
from the North 
Carolina 
Biotechnology 









Collaboration Between Star Scientists and 
Firm Scientists Enhances Research 
Performance of U.S. Biotech Firms, As 
Measured Using Three Proxies: Number of 
Patents Granted, Number of Products in 
Development, and Number of  











in the Life 
Sciences 










Tend to Be Older, More 
Scientifically Experienced 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
Quantitative and Qualitative Research on University-Based  


































Collaboration Between Star Scientists and 
Firm Scientists Enhances Research 
Performance of Japanese Biotech Firms, As 
Measured Using Three Proxies: Number of 
Patents Granted, Number of Products in 












Survey of U.K. 
TTOs 
Universities That Wish to Launch Successful 
Technology Transfer Startups Should Employ 













of U.K. TTOs 
Universities That Generate the Most Startups 
Have Clear, Well-Defined Spinout Strategies, 




















Regressions of the 
Determinants of the 
# of Startups 
Two Key Determinants of Start-up Formation: 
Faculty Quality and the Ability of the 
University and Inventor(s) to Take Equity in a 
Start-up, in Lieu of Licensing Royalty Fees; A 
Royalty Distribution Formula that is More 















Survey of U.K. 
TTOs/ Count 
Regressions of the 
Determinants of the 
# of Startups 
A University’s Rate of Start-up Formation is 
Positively Associated with Its Expenditure on 
Intellectual Property Protection, the Business 
Development Capabilities of TTOs, and the 
Extent to Which its Royalty Distribution 



















from MIT Startups/ 
Hazard Function 
Analysis 
“Radicalness” of the New Technology  and 
Patent Scope Increase the Probability of 
Survival More in Fragmented Industries than 
in Concentrated Sectors 
 Effectiveness of Technology Strategies of 














Regressions of the 
Determinants of the 
# of Startups 
 
 
A University’s Previous Success in 
Technology Transfer is a Key Determinant of 
Its Rate of Start-up Formation   61 
Table 3 (cont.) 
Quantitative and Qualitative Research on University-Based  

























Equity Licensing and Startup Formation Are 
Positively Correlated With TTO Wages; 
Uncorrelated or Even Negatively Correlated 

















There Are Three Key Determinants of Time-to 
Market (Speed): TTO resources, Competency in 
Identifying Licensees, and Participation of 






















The Most Attractive Combinations of 
Technology Stage and Licensing Strategy for 
New Venture Creation-Early Stage Technology 
and Licensing for Equity-Are Least Likely to 
Favored by the University (Due to Risk 
















of U.K. TTOs/ 
Count Regressions 
of the Determinants 
of the # of Startups 
A University’s Rate of Start-up Formation is 
Positively Associated with Its Expenditure on 
Intellectual Property Protection, the Business 
Development Capabilities of TTOs, and the 
Extent to Which its Royalty Distribution 














A University’s Previous Success in Technology 











Case Studies of 
U.K. University 
Spinouts 
In Non-technology Intensive Regions, TTOs 
Tend to Focus on Regional Economic 




















Female Faculty Members Are Less likely to 
Disclose Inventions than Male Faculty 
Members, Even They Appear to Publish at 
Roughly the Same Rate; However, There is 
Evidence That the Rate of Disclosure Activity 
of Women and Men Is Converging Over Time 
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Table 3 (cont.) 
Quantitative and Qualitative Research on University-Based  

























University Financial, Human Capital, and 
Organizational Resources Are Significant 
Predictors of the Rate of Start-up Formation 
and the Number of Initial Public Offering (IPO) 














Universities That Have More Supportive 
Licensing and Entrepreneurial Policies Have 





















Theoretical analysis  
“Outside” Inventors Have Stronger Incentives 
to Invent Than Incumbents. Embryonic 
Inventions Are Best Commercialized by New 
Enterprises Due to the Uncertainty of Their 
Outcomes. Cooperative Invention and 
Commercialization Might Boost Consumer 















Case Studies  
Asserts That U.K. Universities Have Developed 
New Ways To Create Value Through 
Technology Commercialization. This is 
Attributed to New Initiatives That Promote 





















“Gray Market” Activity is Reduced when TTOs 
are Professionalized, but Such Activity is 
Associated With More Valuable Discoveries 



















The Most Significant Determinant of 
Entrepreneurial Behavior Is a Professor’s Belief 
About the Proper Role of Universities in the 
Dissemination of Knowledge. Institutional 
Policies, Such as Royalty Distribution 
































The Institutional, Organizational and Individual Contexts of Technology Transfer Effectiveness 